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Abstract This paper discusses ethnomethodology’s program in relation to the
phenomenological life-world analysis of Alfred Schutz. A recent publication of
Garfinkel’s early writings sheds new light on how he made use of phenomenological
reflections in order to create a new sociological approach. Garfinkel used Schutz’s
life-world analysis as a source of inspiration, called for ‘misreading’ in the sense of
an alternate reading and developed a new, empirical approach to the analysis of
social order which he called ‘ethnomethodology’. Ethnomethodologists usually
acknowledge the historical importance of Schutz but emphasize that Garfinkel
succeeded to overcome the limitations of phenomenological analyses and moved
beyond. This view has spread above all in the Anglosaxon countries. In German
sociology, Schutz’s life-world analysis still has a much stronger standing than
ethnomethodology and is interpreted as a systematic whole. Following Luckmann, it
is discussed as a protosociological foundation of the methodology of social sciences
or, following Srubar, as a philosophical anthropology with two poles: a subjective
and a social, pragmatic pole. Both versions claim to analyze the meaningful con-
stitution of the social world, to serve as a foundation of sociological methodology
and to provide guidelines for an ‘adequate’ sociology. While Garfinkel used phe-
nomenological concepts for sociological analysis, Luckmann clearly distinguishes
the two: you either do phenomenology (protosociology) or you do sociology
(a theoretically guided, empirical sociology of knowledge). This paper describes
the present-day debate in German sociology and compares ethnomethodology’s
program with these interpretations of Schutz’s life-world analysis.
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Introduction
The life-world analysis of Alfred Schutz was received by sociologists in quite
different ways. Two prominent and fundamentally different approaches are Berger
and Luckmann’s Social construction of reality (1966) and Garfinkel’s Studies in
ethnomethodology (1967). Both represent, in Psathas’ (1989) broad sense, a
‘phenomenological sociology,’ but they make quite different uses of phenomenol-
ogy: Berger and Luckmann, on the one hand, distinguish sharply between
phenomenology and sociology on methodological grounds: you do either phenom-
enology or sociology—these are two different enterprises but they can be related in
a sociology of knowledge approach. Garfinkel, on the other hand, used phenom-
enology as a source of inspiration to create a new sociological approach that
explains social order. These two positions can be seen as poles that limit the field of
phenomenological sociology; there are manifold further positions of combining
phenomenology and sociology that lie in between.
The relationship between phenomenology and ethnomethodology is usually
portrayed in the way that Schutz’s seminal work inspired Garfinkel to create an
alternative approach to explain the problem of order than the one of his mentor
Talcott Parsons. In the eyes of ethnomethodologists, Garfinkel has succeeded to
overcome the limitations of Schutz’s phenomenological analyses and to move
beyond. For them, Schutz’s work is nowadays only of historical relevance;
therefore, young ethnomethodologists are usually not anymore familiar with it. I am
going to tell a different story here: In my view, Schutz’s life-world analysis provides
a fruitful frame for assessing the scope of ethnomethodology and for interpreting its
findings. Ethnomethodologists contributed substantially to an empirical exploration
of the life-world but the Schutzian approach is broader and more apt to theoretically
integrate the different studies.
I may add that this is not just my personal opinion but one that is widely shared in
German sociology. Ethnomethodology disseminated much more in the Anglosaxon
world than in the German speaking countries. In the latter, many more sociologists
still adhere to Schutz’s phenomenological life-world analysis and to the sociology
of knowledge as devised by Berger and Luckmann, than to ethnomethodology.
There are many different reasons for this. One may be that US sociology has a
stronger empirical tradition while German sociology is earmarked by a preference
for theoretical and methodological debates. Another reason may be that ethno-
methodology originated in California and spread from there while Luckmann taught
in Germany and exerted a strong impact on German sociology. Both these factors
mutually reinforced each other and there may be, of course, also further reasons for
these different prevalences.
In order to unfold my argumentation I am going to start with the goal and the
results of Schutz’s life-world analysis, which I will describe in its subjective as well
as in its pragmatic aspects. Then I am going to outline how Garfinkel’s program of
ethnomethodology differs from Schutz’s approach, and I will close with a
conclusion that calls for a reconsideration of the relationship between phenome-
nology and ethnomethodology.
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Schutz’s Project of a Life-World Analysis
Schutz (1967) states the goal of his life-world analysis quite clearly: to provide a
philosophical foundation of Max Weber’s ([1922] 1978) approach of an action-
based interpretive sociology. He agreed with the members of the Vienna Circle that
logical consistency is an important methodological postulate for the social as well as
for the natural sciences, but he was aware that logics alone would not suffice. In
contrast to Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World ([1928] 1967) he emphasized
the meaningful structure of the social world (1967) that any methodology of the
social sciences has to take into account. In Schutz’s view, Weber had conceived a
convincing, interpretive approach that defined it as the sociologist’s primary task to
understand the sense (meaning) of social action. Schutz detected several equivo-
cations in Weber’s methodological reflections and set out to eliminate them by
carefully analyzing and describing the meaning structures of the life-world, the
constitution of sense in an actor’s experience, the process of understanding the other
in various kinds of social (spatial and temporal) relationships, and the difference and
relation between the common-sense constructions in everyday life and the
constructions of the social scientist (i.e., of first and second order constructs). The
most systematic, concise and thorough argumentation can still be found in Schutz’s
early book (the translation into English is unfortunately rather unsatisfying). In spite
of the manifold ramifications and diverse topics of his later work, this basic goal
remained the same throughout Schutz’s life. This is well demonstrated by Schutz’s
plan to sum up his findings in his two-volume book The Structures of the Life-
World, its table of contents, and his index cards. Luckmann’s posthumous edition of
this book in two volumes differs in some aspects from the original plan as
Luckmann acted as co-author, but it manifests how rich, detailed, and systematic
Schutz’s life-world analyses altogether were (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, 1989).
Luckmann’s decision to omit the final chapter on methodology from this edition
was, however, not so fortunate as Schutz’s original goal to elaborate a philosophical
foundation of the methodology of the social sciences thereby was lost sight of.
The Phenomenological Life-World Analysis
Schutz’s early work pondered the ‘‘forms of life,’’ analyses that were significantly
influenced by Henri Bergson (Schu¨tz 2006). Motivated by Felix Kaufmann, Schutz
began to study the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl who had developed the
phenomenological method, the constitutive analysis and later the concept of ‘life-
world’. Husserl intended to remedy the Crisis of the European Sciences ([1936]
1970) by a phenomenological life-world analysis. He argued that the sciences had
begun to take their idealizations and abstractions as ‘the real being’ and that their
origin in the natural acts of apperception (‘Anschauung’) had been lost. A
phenomenological analysis of the life-world would explicate this foundation of the
sciences and thereby solve their crisis. Schutz envisaged a similar project for the
social sciences. He did not talk of a ‘‘crisis’’ of the social sciences but he was
convinced that they were in dear need of a philosophical foundation. As Husserl
only meant the natural sciences and their mathematical constructions when talking
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of ‘‘sciences,’’ Schutz had to find his own way to develop a phenomenological life-
world analysis that would serve the social sciences.
Schutz built on many insights of Husserl and contended that the phenomeno-
logical insights that were gained in the reduced sphere of the ‘transcendental
reduction’ are also valid in the realm of the natural attitude. But Schutz saw clearly
that in order to provide the social sciences with a proper foundation, additional
phenomenological analyses were needed in the mundane sphere. Even more crucial
was his dismissal of the ‘‘picture book phenomenology’’ of some of Husserl’s
students, as Edith Stein or Gerda Walther, who used the eidetic method in a rather
naı¨ve way when ‘‘analyzing the problems of social relations, of community, and of
the state’’ and formulated ‘‘certain apodictic and purportedly aprioristic statements
which have contributed toward discrediting phenomenology among social scien-
tists’’ (Schutz 1962: 140–141).
Schutz took a different road when advocating a constitutive analysis of the life-world.
He followed Scheler (1922) and saw his task in developing a philosophical
anthropology. He concludes ‘‘that the empirical social sciences will find their true
foundation not in transcendental phenomenology, but in the constitutive phenomenol-
ogy of the natural attitude’’ (Schutz 1962: 149). Schutz found the link between
phenomenology and sociology in the subjective sense (meaning) of social action.
Sociology is, as Max Weber had shown, a science that understands and explains social
action. All phenomena of the socio-cultural world originate in social action and can be
traced back to its subjective sense (meaning). Phenomenology starts its life-world
analysis with the subjective sense, too, namely with the meaning structures as found in
the lived experience of actors. Like Husserl ([1936] 1970), Schutz attempts to describe
the universal and invariant formal structures of the life-world. A philosophical
anthropology must refer to the conditio humana per se, i.e., to any human being on this
earth. As such it can serve as a tertium comparationis and allows to relate specific
historical and cultural observations to these fundamental formal structures that are the
same for everyone. Philosophical anthropology and sociology therefore have different
tasks: The task of a phenomenological life-world analysis is to explicate the universal
and invariant formal structures of the life-world, and the task of the empirical social
sciences is to research the historical and cultural variety of concrete situations. For an
illustration: Every (‘‘normal’’) actor on earth makes sense by use of his or her subjective
stock of knowledge at hand, applies typifications, is guided by systems of relevances,
orients in time and space and relies on systems of appresentation in order to understand
the other or to relate to transcendent realities. The concrete contents of knowledge,
however, the concrete types that are used and the concrete relevances that are enacted,
and so on, are culturally and historically contingent—their research is therefore the task
of empirical sciences.
In this vein, Luckmann (1973, 1979) designates the phenomenological analysis
of the formal structures of the life-world as a ‘‘protosociology’’ and distinguishes it
sharply from ‘‘sociology’’. A phenomenological analysis is genuinely different from
a sociological analysis:
1. Phenomenology is a philosophy. Its goal is to describe the universal structures
of subjective orientation in the life-world. It therefore analyses phenomena of
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subjective consciousness. Its perspective is egological and its method proceeds
reflexively.
2. Sociology is a science. Its goal is to explain the general properties of the
objective world. It therefore analyses phenomena of the social world. Its
perspective is cosmological and its method proceeds inductively.
Luckmann interprets the universal and invariant structures of the life-world as a
mathesis universalis, a formal matrix that will allow solving the problem of
measurement in the social sciences. By means of this matrix, propositions that are
formulated as empirical observations in a certain cultural and historical language
can get translated into a formal language. It is the specific characteristics of the
phenomenological method that makes such a matrix possible: the phenomenological
reduction elucidates in incremental acts of reflection the conditions of its own
method, the conditions of the provided evidence, and the conditions of commu-
nicating this evidence to others. Schutz has, in Luckmann’s view, succeeded in
providing the scope of such a protosociological matrix, while its details may be
scrutinized through further phenomenological analyses.
Luckmann’s sharp distinction between phenomenology and sociology is based
upon methodological grounds. You either do phenomenology or you do sociology
but there cannot exist such a thing as a ‘phenomenological sociology’ (cf. Eberle
2012). If you do phenomenology you do protosociology, meaning you work on the
philosophical foundation of the methodology of the social sciences. But of course,
sociology should methodologically relate to this protosociology, the sociological
concepts and theories must be compatible with the structures of the life-world. This
implies, for instance, a preference for methodological individualism and, much
more, a dispreference for holistic constructions. Berger and Luckmann (1966)
developed a sociological theory that is based on Schutz’s life-world analysis. The
Social Construction of Reality consists of three parts: (1) The foundations of
knowledge in everyday life; (2) Society as objective reality; and (3). Society as
subjective reality. In the first part the two authors present some key results of
Schutz’s phenomenological analysis of the life-world and call them explicitly
‘‘philosophical prolegomena’’ that are ‘‘presociological’’ and ‘‘not scientific’’ (1966:
20). But they consider them as an apt ‘‘starting point for sociological analysis’’
(ibid.). Based on these protosociological considerations, they design a new
sociology of knowledge that consists of two perspectives: ‘‘Society as objective
reality’’ contains analyses of the processes of institutionalization and legitimation;
‘‘Society as subjective reality’’ treats processes of internalization and the
evolvement of identity. The theoretical reflections in this book provide ample
demonstrations and inspirations of how Schutz’s findings can be seminally used for
sociological analysis and how other sociological theories can be re-interpreted in
their light. The analytical potential of this theory of knowledge still awaits full
exploitation (Endress 2008).
It comes as no surprise that Peter L. Berger, like Luckmann, argues against the
amalgamation of phenomenology and sociology in an enterprise called ‘phenom-
enological sociology’. In an exchange with Tyriakian (1965, 1966) in the ASR,
Berger (1966) criticizes Tyriakian’s way of trying to ‘‘synthesize’’ phenomenology
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and sociology. This happened at a time when—as Bird (2009) points out—
phenomenological sociology was treated quite peripherally by mainstream sociol-
ogy and when many of the arguments that were put forward were primarily
strategic. Later on, Berger left the methodological reflections on phenomenology
and sociology to Luckmann. He did not consider himself a phenomenological
sociologist but preferred labeling his own approach ‘a humanistic sociology’
(Berger 1963).1
The Pragmatic Life-World Theory
As Ilja Srubar (1988, 2007, 2009) has convincingly shown, there is more to Schutz than a
phenomenological analysis of the intentional processes in the subjective consciousness.
Schutz’s life-world analysis has not only a subjective but also a pragmatic, social pole:
The life-world is not only perceived and experienced in subjective consciousness; it is
also constituted by pragmatic social actions. Srubar already detects this ‘‘pragmatic
turn’’ (1988) in Schutz’s early writings and proves the previous biographical
interpretation wrong that Schutz began to integrate concepts and ideas of American
pragmatists after his move to the United States in order to obtain better acceptance.
Schutz complemented, in Srubar’s wording, Husserl’s ‘paradigm of perception’ by a
‘paradigm of action’: a human being is not only ego cogitans but also ego agens. The
pragmatic life-world theory encompasses both: the subjective as well as the pragmatic
pole, and the two are related to each other.
Throughout his life, Schutz proceeded consistently with a phenomenological
approach. Time and again, he reached impasses that evoked doubts about the potential of
a transcendental phenomenology. He judged Husserl’s attempt to clarify intersubjec-
tivity in the transcendental sphere as insufficient and finally as not feasible, and
considered intersubjectivity as ‘‘the fundamental ontological category of human
existence in the world and therefore of all philosophical anthropology’’ (CPIII: 82). The
late Schutz also casted doubts on the eidetic reduction: In his late essay Type and eidos in
Husserl’s late philosophy (CPIII: 92-115) he stated that phenomenological ideation in
search of the eidos ‘‘can reveal nothing that was not preconstituted by the type’’ (CPIII:
115). Schutz realized that his mundane, pragmatic theory of the life-world was a
legitimate counterpart of transcendental phenomenology and emphasized the primacy of
the pragma: it is sociality that founds subjectivity, not the other way around (Srubar
1988: 266). The interaction in a we-relationship represents the heart of mundane
sociality, and thinking is derived from communication (in accordance with Mead).
The exegesis of Schutz’s work usually focused on phenomenology and
overlooked the importance of its pragmatic side. Srubar (1988, 2007, 2009)
systematically carved out these pragmatic aspects and analyzed them in many
publications. Consequently, he does not speak of a ‘phenomenological life-world
analysis’ but of Schutz’s ‘pragmatic life-world theory’. This has a subjective as well
as a pragmatic, social pole, and both are interconnected by Schutz’s theory of
appresentative systems (i.e., apperceptual, appresentational, referential and contex-
tual scheme). The life-world is a material, cultural world—Srubar (1988) uses, like
1 For more information cf. Psathas (2004) and Pfadenhauer (2010).
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Schutz, Voegelin’s notion of ‘Kosmion’—and is on the one hand a social reality and
on the other hand a subjective reality. In the subjective experience the social reality
appears as structured in different spatial, temporal and social zones, and there are
always subjective attitudes to socially imposed relevances. At the same time these
subjects (individuals) were socialized and enculturated by their society. Acting
subjects are also able to transcend their zone of operation and experience different
provinces of meaning, like the worlds of imagination or of dreams. At the same time
these provinces of meaning also have a social counterpart in knowledge systems of
transcendent realities (philosophy, religion, science, art). The linguistic and
symbolic systems of appresentation that allow for such transcendences are also of
social origin. Their crucial function is that they interconnect subjective experience
with social communication.
Srubar’s reinterpretation of Schutz’s life-world analysis counters prominent
criticisms by Habermas and Luhmann who reduced Schutz’s approach to an
analysis of subjective consciousness. Schutz pursued not only a subtle analysis of an
actor’s subjective perspective and of experiences that transcend the paramount
reality of everyday life; he also provided a theory of the autogenesis of social order
in interactions. And his theory of appresentation explicates how the pole of
subjective experience and the pole of social communication are interconnected. The
pragmatic life-world theory of Schutz thereby acquires the same theoretical status as
the foundational approaches of Habermas or Luhmann, and even one that seems
better suited: a theory of constitution that escapes the analytical limitations of
speech-act theory (Habermas) as well as the aporia of the mutual exclusion of the
psychic and the social system (Luhmann). The pragmatic life-world theory—Srubar
calls it a ‘‘theory,’’ presumably due to its theoretical status and scope—shares many
basic premises with symbolic interactionism, and some with ethnomethodology as
well as with Luhmann’s systems theory.
What is the relationship between the pragmatic life-world theory and sociology?
As the life-world in this version has not only a subjective but also an pragmatic,
social pole, Luckmann’s clear-cut distinction between the egological perspective of
phenomenology and the cosmological perspective of sociology does not apply
anymore. Indeed, Srubar does not distinguish between phenomenological protos-
ociology and cosmological sociology. He draws a different line, namely between
theories of constitution and empirical studies of society. In accordance with
Luckmann, he considers Schutz’s pragmatic life-world theory as a philosophical
anthropology and as such as a basic formal matrix and a tertium comparationis that
allows for comparing different cultures. Schutz’s theory of constitution describes
the human reality as an interlinking of life-worlds with a multiplicity of perspectives
and manifold realms of meaning, and it systematically takes into account the
variability of cultural worlds and of different life-forms. As opposed to Luckmann’s
concept, Srubar (1998) considers this matrix not as static; the constitutive
mechanisms are rather seen as the generators of the dynamics, historicity and
differentiation of the life-world. Srubar (2005) shows why and how the pragmatic
life-world theory has more potential to facilitate adequate cultural comparisons,
than have concepts that evolved in a specific scientific discourse (as, for instance,
the dimensions used by Hofstede 1997).
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Ethnomethodology’s Program
Garfinkel and the Phenomenologists
In his Studies in Ethnomethodology Garfinkel (1967: ix) mentions one sociologist
and three phenomenologists as his intellectual mentors: Talcott Parsons, Alfred
Schutz, Aaron Gurwitsch and Edmund Husserl. He already came into contact with
phenomenology during his master’s studies at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill from 1939 to 1942 when he read texts of Husserl, Gurwitsch and
Gestalt-psychologists (Garfinkel 2002: 82ff; Rawls 2002: 11ff). As Psathas (2009)
reports he even took phenomenological writings to the army where he served from
1942 to 1946. In 1946 he began his Ph.D.-studies with Talcott Parsons at Harvard
where he stayed until 1951. During this period he established a relationship with
Aron Gurwitsch whom he visited in his house on a regular basis. And he often
travelled to New York to spend tutorial evenings with Alfred Schutz (Garfinkel
2002: 84). Through these relationships his interest in phenomenology became
deeper and more profound (Rawls 2002: 15). Garfinkel produced two significant
texts in this period that show how his reflections emerged between Parsons’
structural functionalism on the one hand and phenomenology on the other: his study
Seeing sociologically (Garfinkel [1948] 2006) and his dissertation The perception of
the other: a study in social order (Garfinkel 1952). While his dissertation remained
unpublished, a copy from microfiche was available at the library of Harvard
University. Garfinkel’s previous text with the clumsy title Prospectus for an
Explanatory Study of Communicative Effort and the Modes of Understanding in
Selected Types of Dyadic Relationships, however, was most widely unknown and
only recently detected by Anne W. Rawls in Garfinkel’s archives. Rawls published
it in 2006 (Garfinkel 2006) and called it ‘‘a proposal for a dissertation that was never
written’’ (Rawls 2006: 2). This text was fabricated in 1948 and fell, according to
Rawls, ‘‘into the hands of several key thinkers early on: Erving Goffman, Anselm
Strauss, and Harvey Sacks among them’’ (Rawls 2006: 2). Both texts contain
extensive theoretical discussions on the adequacy of theoretical premises and
sociological concepts and provide much of those theoretical clarifications and
background reflections which many had wished to get from Garfinkel, but which to
give he persistently refused later on.
The influence of phenomenology on Garfinkel and his ethnomethodology was
thoroughly analyzed (e.g., Heritage 1984; Lynch 1993, 2004; Sharrock 2004;
Psathas 1989, 2004, 2009; and in German: Eberle 1984, 2000), but not on the basis
of this hitherto unknown text. In Seeing sociologically, Garfinkel (2006) reflects on
some basic theoretical notions, like action, actor, role and the concept of the finite
province of meaning, the noesis-noema structures, social identity, identity constancy
and identity transformation, communication, style, tactics and strategies of
communication, and group. In addition, he ponders on how to design an experiment
that would provide empirical insights (as he did in his dissertation, too). As this text
reveals how much Garfinkel was inspired by phenomenology when developing his
own approach, I will take a closer look at it, focusing on some basic aspects (see
also Eberle 2008).
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From an Egological Perspective to an Observer’s Perspective
Husserl’s phenomenology takes the ego-cogito-cogitatum, i.e., the intentionality of
subjective consciousness as a starting point and analyzes the modes of givenness
of phenomena in their noetic and noematic aspects. The sense (meaning) of
phenomena gets constituted by polythetic acts in the temporal stream of subjective
consciousness. Schutz adopted these analyses and pursued them further in order to
clarify the meaning structure of the social world. Relating to Weber’s conception of
sociology, he emphasized the temporality as well as the perspectivity of meaning
constitution: One must discern the differences between the diverse levels of
meaning, between subjective and objective sense connections, between interpreta-
tion of one’s own actions and the interpretation of others, and between the
perspectives of others in the variety of their different spatial and temporal modes of
givenness. Schutz also pondered on the transcendences: transcending the here and
now by idealizations, transcending one’s body and mind by understanding the other,
or transcending everyday life by entering other finite provinces of meaning. The
life-world analysis of Schutz is, as we have seen, a mundane phenomenology of the
natural attitude and has two poles: a subjective one and a pragmatic, social one. As
we will see, Garfinkel focuses on the pragmatic, social pole.
In Seeing sociologically Garfinkel cites Husserl and Schutz many times,
Gurwitsch twice. In relation to the mundane phenomenology of the natural attitude,
he grounds his reflections exclusively on Schutz’s essay On multiple realities
(1945). In contrast to Schutz, his sociological frame of reference is not the action
theory of Weber but that of Parsons. Garfinkel’s declared goal is ‘‘seeing things
anew’’ (2006: 101) or, as became clearer later on, developing a new sociological
perspective by means of phenomenology:
First, the leading aim of this project is to translate the concept of social
relationship into the terms of communicative efforts between actors. Second,
our problem is to study this communicative endeavor with regard to its
contents, organizations of meanings, the processes and logics of communi-
cative expressions, and the tactics of communication and understanding using
the fact that the experience of incongruity can be experimentally induced as
the means for teasing these various facets out of the closely woven fabric of
social intercourse (Garfinkel 2006: 99f.).
Garfinkel, in other words, already developed the objective and the methodical
procedure of incongruity experiments as a graduate student at the age of 31. Like
Weber and Parsons, he starts with social action and ponders on what ‘‘seeing
sociologically’’ can mean. How can a sociological observer relate to his data? How
is it possible that the world is a fact? He suspends discussing the meaning of such
central notions like ‘existence,’ ‘reality,’ and ‘objectivity’ and adopts a phenom-
enological perspective: ‘‘We shall refer instead to the phenomenological researches
of Edmund Husserl, and accept his views with regard to the considerations involved
for the scientist who seeks a radical and rational empiricism’’ (Garfinkel 2006: 102).
Garfinkel accepts, citing Husserl, ‘‘that the world in fact consists of nothing else
than these noesis-noema structures’’ (2006: 141). His whole argumentation,
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however, rests much less on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology than on the
mundane phenomenology of the natural attitude by Schutz. He quotes many
excerpts from Schutz’s On multiple realities in which the actor’s perspective in the
paramount world of everyday life, the understanding of the other and the
construction of actions by a scientific observer are discussed. The focal point is
the meaningful structure of the social world or, as Garfinkel (2002) will formulate
later, the problem of meaning. In contrast to behaviorism—but also to other
sociological approaches that treat social meanings as intersubjective on the basis of
a shared system of symbols—Garfinkel emphasizes, following Schutz, the diversity
of meanings and the importance of interpretive acts.
Many of Schutz’s analyses of the modes of givenness of social phenomena proceeded
in an egological perspective, and many emphasized the noetic aspect of subjective
experience. But from early on, he made concisely clear that the noematic aspect of social
phenomena consists of social actions and therefore analyzed in detail how the other is
constituted and how he and his actions can be understood: There is no direct access to the
other’s mind and the alter ego’s experiences; it must be mediated by appresentative
systems, such as marks, indications, signs and symbols. Bodily movements, human
‘behavior,’ can be observed and get interpreted as meaningful ‘‘actions’’ by sense-
making. Schutz describes the mechanism of communication from the standpoint of the
actors who enact bodily behavior and reciprocally make sense of it. In the cited essay On
multiple realities, Schutz not only distinctly describes the subjective, but also the
pragmatic pole of his life-world analysis and describes it as mundane, intersubjective
and unquestioned. The social world of everyday life is constituted by social actions, and
this implies reciprocal interactions in which each actor communicates and interprets the
communication of the other.
Subjective experience represents the subjective pole of Schutz’s life-world
analysis, social interactions represent the pragmatic, social pole. Garfinkel is less
interested in an egological analysis of subjective experience but much more, as a
sociologist, in a careful analysis of social actions in everyday life. He develops an
empirical sociological program in an observer’s perspective and points out that
actors make their actions observable, tellable, reportable or—in his famous
wording—‘accountable’. It is the ‘communicative efforts’ of actors that make
actions recognizable, interpretable and intelligible. The task of ethnomethodology
is, as he formulates later on, to analyze the methods, or the practices, with which
such a concerted sense-making in its temporal sequence is achieved.
Garfinkel explicitly embarks on the pragmatic, social pole of Schutz’s life-world
analysis. He is only interested in what is empirically observable, i.e., in social
actions. What happens in the head or in the subjective consciousness of an actor
remains hidden to the observer and is therefore regarded as irrelevant. This is a
significant departure from Schutz’s approach. Schutz always assumed that the
motives of an actor can be understood by another actor in principle, if only
approximately. In the perspective of ethnomethodology it can be observed that
actors attribute or ascribe motives to each other, but this is only of interest as a
matter of communicative acts and of concerted sense-making. Garfinkel follows
Parsons who separated the personal system from the social system and defined the
sociologist’s task to focus on the social system. Accordingly Garfinkel states:
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I shall exercise a theorist’s preference and say that meaningful events are
entirely and exclusively events in a persons’ behavioral environment… Hence
there is no reason to look under the skull since nothing of interest is to be
found there but brains. The ‘skin’ of the person will be left intact. Instead
questions will be confined to the operations that can be performed upon events
that are ‘scenic’ to the person’’ (Garfinkel 1963: 190).
This is a wonderful argument against recent attempts of neuroscience to link
brain functions with realms of meaning. On the other hand, neither Parsons’
structural functionalism nor Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory have denied that the
subjective consciousness as well as the social system both operate with meaning.
There is a significant accordance between Garfinkel and Luhmann as the latter, too,
argues that sociological analysis must be restricted to social communication
(Luhmann ([1984] 1995). One of the differences, however, is that Luhmann’s grand
theory also describes systems of consciousness (which in this theory belong to the
environment of the social system, or more specifically, of the communication
system),2 while Garfinkel dismisses the term of consciousness completely. But there
are further commonalities of Garfinkel and Luhmann, as for example the
elimination of anthropological premises.
The Elimination of Anthropological Premises
As was argued above, Schutz advocated a mundane phenomenology of the natural
attitude and a philosophical anthropology because he became skeptical of the potential
of transcendental phenomenology. He realized the shortcomings of the transcendental as
well as of the eidetic reduction and already dispensed in the Phenomenology of the social
world with the epoche´, the bracketing of generally accepted assumptions of the natural
attitude. He posited the general thesis of the existence of the alter ego, and added further
anthropological premises later on. While Husserl insisted that the transcendental ego
was not synonymous with the ego of a human being, Schutz did not only refer to the
cognizing subject per se but to human individuals with their bodies and their
consciousness, and in their sociality and historicity. This is manifested by many of
Schutz’s concepts, like human action, biographically determined stock of knowledge at
hand, biographically determined hierarchy of plans, our knowledge and fear of dying as
the fundamental anxiety (Heidegger) from which ‘‘spring the many interrelated systems
of hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man
within the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to
draft projects, and to realize them’’ (Schutz 1962: 228), as well as, finally, his famous
proposition that ‘‘as long as human beings are not concocted like homunculi in retorts but
are born and brought up by mothers, the sphere of the ‘We’ will be naively presupposed’’
and is, as Scheler asserted, ‘‘pregiven to the sphere of the I’’ (Schutz 1962: 168).
In this respect Garfinkel differs distinctly from Schutz: He dismisses all
anthropological premises. Actors in the ethnomethodological perspective are no
concrete individuals with flesh and blood, who act on the basis of their intentions,
2 As the personality system belongs to the environment of the social system in Parsons’ (1966) general
action system.
Phenomenological Life-World Analysis and Ethnomethodology’s Program 289
123
play different roles in different settings and who have a self or a personal identity, a
biography or plans for their future. Actors are rather meaningful constructions that
are produced in a given sequence of interaction. Put laconically: For ethnometh-
odology there exist no actors but only actions. It is not actors that produce actions
but rather actions that produce actors. Many non-ethnomethodologists have
misunderstood this point and connoted the notion of Garfinkel’s actor with the
premises of methodological individualism and/or the ontological assumptions of the
natural attitude; they assumed that actors are human beings who enter a situation
and act and communicate in it.
Actors are no persons (Garfinkel 2006: 186) but identities that are constructed by
situated actions. Later on Garfinkel introduced the concept of ‘member’ (1967: 76),
which, in Parsons’ sense, implies membership in a collectivity. He thereby reduced
the inclination to reify actors as individuals or human beings. Deciding if someone
is a member is not up to the scientific observer but rather to the other members of
the collectivity: A member is who is accepted as a ‘member’ in interaction, and this
is empirically observable.
Garfinkel not only dismisses an essentialist concept of actors but also abstains
from other reifying constructions, as for instance the conception that actors are
something like containers of knowledge and motives. He abandons concepts like
‘‘subjective stocks of knowledge’’ or ‘‘shared knowledge’’ and focuses exclusively
on the question of ‘‘How?’’ How is communication achieved? How can members
recognize if they have reached a common understanding (for all practical purposes)?
How can misunderstandings or diverging perspectives be detected? How is a woman
identifiable as a woman, and jurors as jurors? In 1953 Garfinkel introduced the
notion of ‘ethnomethods’ and of ‘ethnomethodology,’ since then he speaks of
‘members methods’. The basic idea is simple and plausible: Everyday life is ordered
meaningfully. This order is produced and made intelligible by members. Thus the
members must know methods to achieve this (Garfinkel 1974).
Later on, Garfinkel speaks of ‘‘embodied practices’’. By the notion of ‘‘practices’’
he avoids a confusion with action theory that is often associated with ‘‘action’’ and
‘‘actors’’. By ‘‘embodied’’ he points to the bodies involved—which is the result of
studying Merleau-Ponty (1962)— but not in the sense of the bodies of ‘‘actors’’ but
in the sense of ‘‘embodied practices’’. When observing practices one inevitably
observes bodily movements, and the practices in their pursuit constitute the situated
identities of involved members. Now and then, the late Garfinkel still spoke of
‘‘actors’’ and ‘‘the actor’s point of view’’ but always in this restricted sense. He
considers settings as self-organizing and thereby eliminates the nimbus of an agens.
Here we find another analogy to Luhmann’s systems theory as Luhmann also tries to
eliminate all the anthropological assumptions and metaphysical premises that are
taken as a matter of course in the natural attitude of everyday life und usually
remained unquestioned in sociology, too. In Luhmann’s theory it is not actors but
the communication system that communicates, and if there are ‘‘persons’’ or
‘‘actors’’ it is because the communication system decides to constitute ‘‘persons’’
and ‘‘actors’’ and to attribute ‘‘actions’’ and ‘‘behaviors’’ to them.
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A New Perspective on the Problem of Order
Already in his first text, Seeing sociologically, Garfinkel (2006: 109ff.) considered
actors not as concrete entities but as ‘‘symbol treaters’’. And he found in Schutz’s
([1945] 1962) concept of cognitive style ‘‘a set of conceptions that will specify the
conditions of treatment’’ (109):
…(The) ‘cognitive style’ has been defined when the empirical specifications
of the following concepts have been provided: (1) epoche´; (2) a specific form
of sociality; (3) a specific mode of attention to life; (4) a specific form of
spontaneity; (5) a specific mode of time consciousness; and (6) a specific way
of experiencing the self. There are at least six features of cognitive style.
Further experience may reveal more (Garfinkel 2006: 110).
Schutz used these criteria in order to characterize and discern multiple realities, like
the world of everyday life, the worlds of imageries and phantasms, the world of dreams
or the world of science. Garfinkel suggests using them to describe empirical social
settings and exemplifies this by pondering on which cognitive style a guard of the
university library has. He considers the structure of the library ‘‘as a system of
coordinated actions’’ (110) in which a class of social persons is responsible to prevent
theft. He asks a set of hypothetical questions to the guard and demonstrates by
hypothetical answers that Schutz’s criteria are quite illuminating for describing which
cognitive style a guard operates with. At the same time it becomes evident that proper
methods for an empirical investigation of such issues await development.
Following Parsons (and Hobbes), Garfinkel accepts the problem of social order as
the key question of sociology. In Seeing sociologically he already states that Parsons
had been radical about the problem but not radical enough in his theoretical analyses
(2006: 137). In particular he failed to challenge some very important naturalistic
constructions. The invariant structures that Husserl’s phenomenology described
were in this respect quite different from the theoretical framework that Parsons
proposed in The Structure of Social Action ([1937] 1968). The latter was applicable,
as Schutz had shown, to teleological action but not to expressive, for instance
intimate activities. In his dissertation of 600 pages, The perception of the other,
Garfinkel (1952: 90–150) compares the constitutive premises of Parsons’ approach
with those of Schutz’s life-world analysis and treats them as two alternative
paradigms for explaining social order: the ‘‘correspondence theory’’ and the
‘‘congruence theory,’’ both of which he characterizes and compares along six
criteria. Although a doctoral student of Parsons, Garfinkel favored the congruence
theory of Schutz and designed and carried out his first incongruity experiment
(391–602). His basic idea was this: If a social situation is considered as a
meaningful order of objects, it represents a finite province of meaning that is based
on the operation of a certain cognitive style that is shared among the members.
Breaching one of these constitutive assumptions should—this was the hypothesis—
cause trouble and produce disorder.
The correspondence between Schutz and Garfinkel (Psathas 2009) reveals that
Schutz doubted if there are such fundamental differences between the theoretical
decisions of Parsons and those of himself. And he was uncertain if he had really
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understood what Garfinkel meant by ‘‘correspondence theory’’ or ‘‘congruence
theory’’ and if they have such different implications for empirical research. Indeed,
in his correspondence with Parsons, Schutz had argued that the phenomenological
analysis of the ‘subjective perspective’ would serve as a frame of reference for
Parsons’ sociological theory and that Parsons would not need to modify his
approach. The phenomenologically explicated structures of the life-world would
rather make evident which meaning transformations sociological theories produce
when translating the subjective sense of actions in everyday life into scientific
models of homunculi (Schutz and Parsons 1978).
Developing Adequate Sociological Descriptions
The major goal of Schutz’s life-world analysis was to provide a proper philosophical
foundation to the methodology of the social sciences. In contrast to the natural
sciences, the methodology of the social sciences requires a constitution theory of the
social world. Based on his analyses, Schutz formulated a number of methodological
postulates the most important of which are the postulate of subjective interpretation
and the postulate of adequacy. Schutz (1962: 24ff.) demonstrates that the ‘‘postulate
of the subjective interpretation of meaning’’ originates in everyday life and is a
principle of constructing course-of-action types in common-sense experience. A
social science that intends to describe and explain social reality also has to adopt this
principle. It requires that generalizations and idealizations on a high level of
abstraction are accepted only as a kind of shorthand and must be transformable to the
subjective sense of human action. The postulate of adequacy requires that the second-
order constructs of the social scientist are consistent with the first-order constructs of
common-sense experience of the social reality. This implies that each term of a
scientific model of human action must be comprehensible to the actor in question as
well as to his co-actors on a common-sense level (40). Schutz considered it as the
most important task of an action theory analyzing the method of typification in its
details. Social scientists must attend carefully to each subtle change of meaning that
results from a modification of the system of relevances or of a transformation from
abstract to concrete notions and from anonymous to personal ideal-types. And Schutz
points out that there always remains an insurmountable difference (or gap) between
the homunculi of a social scientific model and the common-sense experience of
actors in everyday life, because the ideal–typical constructions can never capture
those aspects that transcend the type.
On the one hand, these postulates are quite challenging as a great number of
social scientific theories do not comply with them. On the other hand, they are not
concise enough to solve disputes between diverse action theories. While Schutz
explained the postulate of subjective interpretation quite extensively, his definition
of the postulate of adequacy remained rather vague. He also changed its formulation
several times without making it much clearer over the course of time. As a
methodologist, he regarded himself as scholar of the scientists and not its tutors. He
spent quite some reflection on a descriptive analysis of economics (cf. Eberle 1988,
2009) which formed the context of his academic socialization in Vienna. As I have
argued elsewhere (Eberle 2010), Schutz presumably did not wish to publicly
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criticize his friends from Austrian Economics and the Mises-Circle. In his personal
correspondence, however, he did. I have therefore suggested formulating the
postulate much more restrictively: Adequacy requires capturing the actors’s
subjective sense (meaning) empirically (which restricts rational choice models to
quite a narrow realm of human action).
Garfinkel was more rebellious than Schutz. His conception of adequacy is much
more radical and restrictive than the version of Schutz. In addition, he was not
interested in the adequacy of scientific homunculi constructions but in the adequacy
of empirical descriptions. An adequate description in Garfinkel’s sense requires that
the observable practices in a setting are described in all their details and thereby
explicate how social order is produced, made accountable and intelligible. Garfinkel
actually implements the famous dictum of phenomenology: ‘‘Back to the
phenomena!’’ Ethnomethodology analyzes what is empirically observable, discern-
able and intelligible. It attends to the details that are usually overlooked by other
social scientists, and investigates how they are constitutive of the ongoing event.
With this focus on the actor’s perspective and the details of social action, Garfinkel
challenged the prevailing criteria for adequate research. As Rawls (2002: 51ff.) has
argued, he directly contradicted ‘‘the faith in formalism, technical reason, and
mathematicized representations of social behavior that came do define postwar
sociology’’ (52), and he also avoided ‘‘the fallacy of misplaced abstraction’’ in
which interpretive sociologists and pragmatists had engaged (51). Garfinkel was
critical towards the general and abstract concepts of Parsons’ structural function-
alism, but also of poststructuralism and postmodernism—‘‘the details of social order
should be empirically observable without conceptual or theoretical mediation’’ (52).
The concepts of sociological theories are only ‘‘glosses,’’ they rather obscure than
clarify social reality.
Grounded on this perspective, Garfinkel developed an empirical research
program that is characterized by openness, intellectual curiosity and a willingness
to experiment. He used interviews, observations, field reports from his students, a
variety of breaching experiments as well as audio- and video-taped materials for
ethnomethodological analysis. And these analyses consisted in highly complex,
elaborated and detailed reflections that were formulated in a difficult language and
therefore remained incomprehensible to many readers. If Garfinkel really succeeded
in clarifying social reality or if he rather obscured it himself, is a matter of debate. In
any case, all those of his students who attempted to explain what Garfinkel ‘‘really’’
thought and how he could be ‘‘properly’’ understood (as, for instance, Leiter 1980;
Handel 1982; Heritage 1984; Livingstone 1987; Lynch and Sharrock 2011; in
Germany: Bergmann 1987/1988, 2000a, b), were a great help to others to whom
Garfinkel’s writings remained rather inaccessible. Recently, Rawls (2002, 2006,
2008)—although not a direct student of Garfinkel but a scholar with close contact to
him—has provided many illuminating comments and explanations in her introduc-
tions to Garfinkel’s texts that she recently published (Garfinkel 2002, 2006, 2008).
Internal debates among ethnomethodologists, however, show that there is no broad
consensus about the ‘‘proper’’ interpretation. And insiders know that Garfinkel
himself was not very helpful in clarifying things. His focus was on doing
ethnomethodology, not on talking about it.
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Since the 1970s more and more ethnomethodologists converted to conversation
analysis as CA seemed to produce ‘‘better,’’ i.e., more demonstrable and plausible
results. This reduced the scope of research interest but strengthened the methodical
rigor: Interview data or field notes is not accepted as proper data anymore, only
audio- and video-taped material are used for analysis. This allows for attending to
detail in ways no other procedure does; each sequence of interaction can be repeated
a hundred times until everything has been analyzed in every detail. Ethnometh-
odology and conversation analysis have much enriched qualitative methods and
qualitative research, especially with its research attitude that no proposition is
accepted if it cannot be substantiated in the data at hand. And the rigorous stance
that all relevant context is to be produced within the setting prohibited an observer
or analyst to introduce contextual knowledge from the outside: either it is
observably made relevant within the setting or it is of no importance for the analysis
either. This methodical principle helped, as in hermeneutics, to discern very
carefully which knowledge was of use in the observed setting and what could not be
seen properly in the data.
While many ethnomethodologists had become conversation analysts, Garfinkel
developed the studies of work (Garfinkel 1986). In this context he developed the
concept of ‘‘unique adequacy’’: ethnomethodologists should be competent practi-
tioners of the subject they study. If you investigate ordinary conversations you may
assume that any ordinary member of that collectivity is a competent practitioner. If
you research a setting with a particular population, however, like a science
laboratory or the work of a special profession, it is difficult to make proper sense of
what is going on if you are not a competent member of that setting. Garfinkel
therefore required that his students became competent practitioners of the work they
studied; that they become mathematicians in order to pursue the work of
mathematicians; that they become lawyers in order to study the work of lawyers,
and so on. If you want to understand the details of the local order production, an
ethnomethodologist must not only be acquainted with the field but be a competent
practitioner of that type of work setting him- or herself. In his recent publication
Garfinkel (2002) even moved a step further by not tying ‘‘adequacy’’ to descriptions
but to (successful) instructions.
Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology: A Reconsideration
Protosociology, Philosophical Anthropology and Phenomenological Sociology
Let us sum up some major aspects. In German sociology, the results of Schutz’s life-
world analysis are seen as a whole. The analysis of the structures of the life-world
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973, 1989) represent, as Schutz had intended, a
philosophical foundation of the social sciences. Luckmann calls them a protoso-
ciology that functions as a mathesis universalis, serves as a tertium compartionis
and allows for solving the problem of measurement in the social sciences. He makes
a sharp distinction between protosociology and sociology on methodological
grounds: The life-world analysis proceeds phenomenologically, sociology
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scientifically. Phenomenology is a philosophy that aims at describing the universal
structures of subjective orientation in the life-world. It analyzes phenomena of
subjective consciousness in an egological perspective by means of a reflexive
method. Sociology is a science that aims at explaining the general properties of the
objective world. It analyzes phenomena of the social world in a cosmological
perspective by means of an inductive method. Therefore, there is no such thing like
a ‘phenomenological sociology’ but of course, protosociology and sociology should
be related. Berger and Luckmann (1966) designed such a relationship in The social
construction of reality, a phenomenologically based sociology of knowledge.
Luckmann (2007: 127–137) consequently distinguished between the subjective
constitution in subjective consciousness and the social construction in society.
While Luckmann emphasized the phenomenological aspect of Schutz’s life-
world analysis, Srubar elaborated the—hitherto rather overlooked—pragmatic
aspect. He showed that Schutz developed two poles of the life-world: the subjective
pole and the pragmatic, social pole. The life-world is not only constituted in
subjective consciousness—the subjective pole—but also in social reality: actors
produce through their operations and interactions a material, cultural world. The
pragma is, in other words, not just the subject of sociology but also—on a
fundamental level—of the life-world analysis. Srubar does not call this a
protosociology but a philosophical anthropology, as Schutz did following Scheler.
Nevertheless, he agrees with Luckmann with regard to its basic function: it serves as
a tertium comparationis that provides a proper basis for the methodology of the
social sciences. In contrast to the natural sciences, the methodology of the social
sciences does not only have one but two pillars: It does not suffice to ponder on the
rationality of constructing scientific hypotheses and models; the methodology of the
social sciences in addition requires a constitution theory of the meaningful
structures of the social world (Eberle and Srubar 2010; Schu¨tz 2010). As a tertium
comparationis it also allows for cultural comparisons in a new way.
These two variants, the phenomenological protosociology and the pragmatic
constitution theory, are the prevailing interpretations of Schutz’s life-world analysis
in German sociology. Despite their differences, they have much in common: Both
consider the results of Schutz’s life-world analysis as a whole and as a proper
foundation of the methodology of the social sciences. A third one, the social
phenomenology as conceived by Richard Grathoff (1989), remained much less
influential. Grathoff feared that Schutz’s structures of the life-world had become
reified and called for concrete phenomenological studies of social milieus. The
picture has nowadays multiplied in manifold ways, as a recent book on
Phenomenology and Sociology (Raab et al. 2008) demonstrates, but the basic lines
as outlined above are still clearly visible.
In the United States, Schutz’s life-world analysis was received differently. It was
of interest to phenomenological philosophers, on the one hand, and to sociologists
on the other. George Psathas (2004) wrote a detailed account of Alfred Schutz’s
influence on American sociologists and sociology. He states that this influence did
not occur during Schutz’s lifetime but after his death, and focuses on three
outstanding sociologists to describe it: Schutz’s students Helmut Wagner and Peter
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L. Berger, and Harold Garfinkel who was not his student but who was, as we have
seen, clearly influenced by Schutz.
Wagner became a Schutzian social scientist, expositor of Schutz’s ideas and
later a biographer of Schutz; Peter Berger was one of the first to introduce a
broad based phenomenological perspective to a generation of sociologists.
Then, with Thomas Luckmann, Schutz’s concepts and theories were
introduced by incorporating them in their formulation of what became an
influential version of the sociology of knowledge. Harold Garfinkel’s
development of ethnomethodology owes its origins to Schutz’s remarkable
insights into the world of everyday life, common sense knowledge, and the
taken-for-granted (Psathas 2004: 9).
Berger basically agreed with Luckmann’s position but did not push the idea of a
phenomenological protosociology any further. Although Berger and Luckmann’s
Social construction of reality was quite influential in North American sociology,
too, there were obviously not many sociologists who interpreted the life-world
analysis as a protosociology that would found the methodology of sociology. Many
did presumably not even realize the clear distinction between phenomenology and
sociology upon which the structure of the book was built; most perceived it rather as
an alternative sociological approach. This is undoubtedly due to the strong influence
of Garfinkel. Most of Garfinkel’s students perceived Schutz as precursor of
ethnomethodology and many abandoned talking of phenomenology per se. A
number of sociologists, however, adhered to phenomenology and disseminated the
label ‘phenomenological sociology’.
The most famous among the proponents of a phenomenological sociology was
George Psathas (1973, 1989). He was modest enough not to mention himself as one
of those American sociologists who was strongly influenced by Schutz (Psathas
2004). Psathas remained one of the few who kept close ties to phenomenology while
also maintaining ties to ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, which is
manifested by his committed involvement in the Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy as well as in the International Institute of Ethnomethodology
and Conversation Analysis. It may have been through the influence of Herbert
Spiegelberg (1982), whose seminars at Washington University in St. Louis he
attended, that Psathas saw phenomenology as a broad movement rather than a single
strand. In this vein, Psathas kept an integrative position or, as Bird (2009) calls it, an
assimilative approach. In contrast to all the common practices of demarcation and
exclusion, he emphasized the commonalities without disregarding the differences
(cf. Eberle 2012).
Phenomenological sociologists sought to find a ‘‘synthesis’’ between phenom-
enology and sociology (Waksler 1969). Psathas designates phenomenology ‘‘as
philosophy, method, and approach for social science’’ and Alfred Schutz is said to
provide ‘‘a direct entry into phenomenological sociology’’ (Psathas 1973: 7). He
considered phenomenological sociology as a new paradigm that offers an alternative
to the restricted potential of positivist perspectives—at the time behaviorism and
structural functionalism. For Psathas (1973, 1989), phenomenological sociology
offers a fresh, open, and innovative approach that encourages suspension of the
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natural attitude, seeing the phenomena-as-they-are, and avoiding preconceived
sociological notions and concepts as well as the established recipes and formulas of
research procedure. In Psathas’ interpretation, ‘‘questions about how the life-world
is possible, how one can know another’s mind, whether society is objectively real,
and so forth,’’ must be tackled by philosophy. Studying ‘‘the life-world as it is
experienced by ordinary human beings living in it’’ and ‘‘to discover what they are
experiencing, how they interpret their experiences, and how they themselves
structure the social world in which they live’’ are, however, tasks of phenomeno-
logical sociology (1973: 15f.).
Is Ethnomethodology a Phenomenological Sociology?
Psathas (1989: 79–98) explicitly calls ethnomethodology a phenomenological
approach in the social sciences and carefully discusses the differences and
commonalities between Schutz’s phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and other
versions of a sociology of knowledge (Psathas 1989, 2004, 2009). Garfinkel
acknowledged that he was extensively influenced and inspired by phenomenolo-
gists, in particular by Schutz, later by Merleau-Ponty, but he has never labeled his
approach a ‘phenomenological sociology’. He created the new term ‘ethnometh-
odology’ and launched it from the outset as a novel sociological approach to the
problem of social order. Furthermore, he practiced and recommended the method of
‘‘misreading’’—scholarly faithfulness has never been a priority of ethnomethodol-
ogy, it was considered appropriate to raid other scholars for ideas that might be
useful to empirical inquiry (see Lynch 2004 and Sharrock 2004 in their discussion
with Dennis 2004). By ‘‘misreading’’—which was often misunderstood—Garfinkel
did not mean ‘‘reading incorrectly’’ but ‘‘reading alternately’’ (2002: 112, n36).
Is Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology a phenomenological sociology? Yes and no. Let
us go back to Husserl’s ego-cogito-cogitatum. As Srubar has argued, the life-world
has a subjective and a pragmatic, social pole. The life-world is therefore not only
perceived and experienced in subjective consciousness; it is also constituted by
pragmatic social actions. Social phenomena always have noetic as well as noematic
aspects. While the question ‘‘What can I know?’’ makes us consider the noesis, the
question ‘‘Why do we see something as something?’’ leads to the noema, to the
meaningful actions that constitute the social world. Garfinkel’s question ‘‘What
makes jurors ‘jurors’?’’ is therefore a genuine phenomenological question that
focuses on the noema. While Schutz primarily analyzed more the noetic aspect, the
mode of givenness of social phenoma, Garfinkel is more interested in the noema of
social phenomena. Both Schutz and Garfinkel were, however, aware that the noema
of pragmatic, social phenomena is constituted by communicative efforts. Garfin-
kel’s Agnes was recognizable as a woman because she made herself accountable as
a woman. Insofar as ethnomethodology pursues constitutive analyses of social
phenomena it may be properly called, in Psathas’ broad meaning of the term, a
phenomenological approach in sociology.
On the other hand, classic phenomenological analysis starts with the subjective
experiences of the ego, not with those of the alter ego. Some phenomenologists—
even phenomenological sociologists—are interested in exploring the experiences of
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participants of concrete social settings before they were transformed into text.
Subjective experiences, nota bene, that are not observable by observers; the
researcher must therefore participate and phenomenologically analyze his own,
personal experiences (Hitzler and Eberle 2004). Ethnomethodology restricts its
empirical inquiry to the pragmatic, social pole of the life-world and does not extend
it to the subjective pole. It is, in Srubar’s terminology, only interested in the pragma
of the life-world and not in the intentional acts of subjective consciousness. The
actor’s point of view is analyzed only insofar as it is empirically observable; all the
rest of his or her subjectivity is lost. Of course, to take into account other aspects of
the actor’s subjective experiences would imply to extend the type of accepted data
to talk, interview or narration.
It is certainly legitimate—as it is for any other sociological approach—that
ethnomethodology explicitly restricts its focus of inquiry and also accepts only
certain kinds of data, as video-recorded data. As already stated above, ethnometh-
odology (and conversation analysis) have contributed much to the quality of
qualitative research. As Schutz’s life-world analysis is broader in scope, it allows—
as a tertium comparationis—to clarify a little bit the scope of ethnomethodology.
All of Schutz’s insights that he gained by the phenomenological analysis of the
modes of givenness in the subjective consciousness remain beyond the scope of
ethnomethodology if they are not observable by an alter ego: the petites
perceptions, dreams and fantasies, memories and anticipations of an actor, religious
and mystic experiences, and so on. Schutz’s life-world analysis elucidates how
much of an actor’s subjective experience is missing. In addition, it clearly describes
the fundamental differences of analyzing one’s own experiences and analyzing the
meanings another actor displays. Ethnomethodology can, of course, counter that all
these subjective experiences are dispensable for explaining social order; that they
are only relevant insofar as they are accountable and observable in a social setting.
Although this assumption helps to discipline empirical analyses methodically, it
is only partially plausible. The practice of interpreting recorded material makes
evident that it is often difficult to discern what actors actually orient themselves to.
In workplace studies, for instance, there are practices that you can recognize by
observation; others, however, remain indeterminable. You can follow a person’s
gaze but cannot figure out what the person really looks at, and of course, you cannot
find out what the person actually sees when looking at something. Is that irrelevant
because it was not sequentially implicative? Maybe it is sequentially implicative
later on, and the researcher does not realize it? Why not talk to the actor and listen
what he or her has to tell about his or her orientation? Why not use his or her
subjective experience as a resource for further analysis?
Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002) researched currency traders at work. The
traders sat in front of many monitors scanning them constantly. As the observers
often could not recognize what they were looking at, and even less what they were
seeing, they asked them: What are you looking at, what are you seeing, what does
that mean for your on-going work? This simple procedure proved very helpful,
although it was a little intrusive as the dealers had to tell things they usually do not
tell while working. But the observers this way understood much more of what was
going on than by pure observation. Garfinkel’s unique adequacy criterion was taken
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care of, as Bruegger had worked as a currency trader on the same trading floor for
4 years and was a skilled practitioner in the field. Nevertheless, he reported3 that
sometimes he could not make sense of an action that he observed; when asking that
trader what he was doing and why, the trader resisted to explain and said: you know
that yourself! The observed trader assumed that what he was doing was common
practice and would be intersubjectively intelligible to members, but in fact it was
not. This instance shows that Garfinkels ‘‘unique adequacy criterion’’ requires
stretching in the direction of Schutz’s postulate of adequacy: Intersubjectivity or
reciprocity of perspectives, as Schutz called it, may be given if something is
common routine. Actions that are beyond routine, however, cannot be understood as
easily by a peer, not even by a competent practitioner in the field. The unique
adequacy criterion assumes that practitioners know, but it must be ultimately
radicalized and understood as adequacy in Schutz’s sense: grasping the subjective
sense of an action adequately.
To sum up: Human beings experience their life-world at its subjective pole as
well as its pragmatic, social pole. Much of what they experience is not ‘‘real’’ in the
sense of the paramount reality of everyday life, but only dreamed or imagined and
fantasized about. And only part of the subjective experiences in everyday life
concern the social world. Schutz’s life-world analysis spans the whole spectrum.
Goffman, like Garfinkel, studied the interaction order and was as broad as Schutz in
his theoretical scope: In his Frame Analysis (1974) he studied the organization of
experience in its social as well as subjective aspects.4 Ethnomethodology restricts its
focus to social phenomena, i.e., to the pragmatic pole of the life-world and to
observable, recordable data only. But the field of ethnomethodology has meanwhile
diversified, too. More and more ethnomethodologists are opening up to ethno-
graphic procedures and are taking other sorts of data into account, too. And many
integrative concepts of Goffman as well. Phenomenological sociologists, in Psathas’
broad interpretation, have remained open to the subjective pole of the life-world all
along, aiming at discovering what actor’s are experiencing, how they interpret their
experiences and how they structure the social world they live in. Phenomenological
sociologists may reflect moreover, as also Psathas (1973) has argued, on their own
subjective experiences in order to gain insights into the dynamics of the social
world.5
Life-World Analysis as Protosociological Foundation: An Obsolete Project?
Husserl ([1936]1970) hoped to solve The crisis of European sciences by a
transcendental analysis of the life-world. Schutz intended to provide the social
sciences with a proper philosophical foundation through a phenomenological life-
world analysis. In Luckmann’s view, Schutz’s structures of the life-world are such a
protosociology, a mathesis universalis and tertium comparationis for the social
sciences. This project can be elaborated and refined, but it remains a project of
3 Personal communication (Brugger pursued this research at our institute).
4 For a comparison of Schutz and Goffman see Eberle (1991).
5 For recent versions of a phenomenological sociology, see Bird (2009) or Nasu (2012).
Phenomenological Life-World Analysis and Ethnomethodology’s Program 299
123
establishing a foundation for the methodology of the social sciences. However, has
this project not become obsolete at the beginning of the 21st century? Who, after the
wave of postmodernism, still believes in a ‘‘proper,’’ even ‘‘apodictic’’ (Husserl),
philosophical foundation of the social sciences? Hermeneutic philosophy (Bollnow
1970) has asserted for several decades already that there is no archimedic point of
cognition and no stable foundation for any kind of reflection.
Luckmann acknowledges the problem of epistemological reflexivity: Phenom-
enological analysis cannot avoid using language for its descriptions and cannot strip
itself completely from a specific colloquial language. Even if the method of
phenomenological reduction allows the systematic stripping of cognition from the
historically and culturally specific elements, how can we be sure that we have
reached that plane of universal and invariant insights? To solve this problem,
Knoblauch suggests—in line with Luckmann—a triangulation of three different
methods: the phenomenological method is ‘‘to be corrected and complemented by
two other methods: (a) the ‘cosmological’ methods of the sciences studying the
human body, on the one hand, and (b) the sciences studying the variety of human
culture and social structure, on the other’’ (Knoblauch 2011: 140f.). If such a
triangulation is accepted, Luckmann’s dualistic methodological distinction between
phenomenology and science still holds, but the sciences then are included in the
foundational project, at least for correction and complementarity. Dreher further-
more reports that Luckmann called for a ‘‘parallel action’’ of phenomenological and
social scientific research (2007: 9f., 2009).
In conclusion, nobody nowadays assumes that the phenomenological or the
pragmatic life-world analysis by Schutz (or others) provide an ‘‘apodictic’’
foundation of the methodology of the social sciences. But there is no alternative
in sight that is so broad in scope and so rich in detail. Schutz’s life-world analysis
hitherto provides the best constitution theory of the meaningful structures of the
social world—which is the second, and crucial pillar of the methodology of the
social sciences. It must not be reified but represents an apt framework to scrutinize
methodological questions of sociology.
Ethnomethodology as a Sociologia Perennis?
Garfinkel did not perceive Schutz’s life-world analysis as a whole but used single
essays for inspiration in order to find a novel sociological approach. He set out to
pursue constitutive analyses of social phenomena as an empirical, sociological
enterprise. He reduced his focus to the pragmatic, social pole of the life-world and
restarted analysis anew. By attending to the ‘‘haecceities,’’ to the contingencies and
to the subtle details of concrete social situations, he fulfilled the original dictum of
phenomenology: Back to the phenomena! Garfinkel proved to be very creative and
innovative, and he inspired more than one generation of ethnomethodologists
and many sociologists beyond. He enriched sociology greatly by a new perspective
and contributed to qualitative research by novel methodological premises and new
methodical procedures. However, while Husserl and Schutz strived for a philos-
ophia perennis, i.e., for universal philosophical insights that are independent of a
specific epoch or culture, the status of Garfinkel’s constitutive rules, ethnomethods,
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or practices have remained obscure. Did he strive for a sociologia perennis? And
where did he end up?
The goals of Husserl’s and of Schutz’s life-world analyses were clear: to describe
the universal and invariant structures of the life-world. Schutz’s phenomenological
and pragmatic analyses intended to gain insights that apply to the conditio humana
per se—that means they are formulated on an adequately abstract and general level.
Garfinkel resisted to specify how general and abstract ethnomethods should be
described. How many of the elucidated practices extend over several settings, and
how many are specific to the concrete setting under investigation? This remained
vastly unclear, and one sometimes gets the impression that ethnomethodologists
employ the same ‘‘theoretical’’ concepts and the same methods of analysis, but it
does not become manifest if their empirical insights refer only to that specific
research setting or if they are meant to be more general. It is certainly an illusion to
purport the principle of data-guidedness, refuse theoretical considerations and hope
that further research will provide more clarity. In my opinion, it is high time to
attempt giving an overview over the crucial empirical insights that ethnomethod-
ological studies have provided so far. After half a century of ethnomethodological
research, such an inventory as well as a theoretical assessment of the findings ought
to be feasible. Schutz’s life-world analysis could serve as a frame of reference for
such an endeavor.6
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